

European Identity

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Introduction and Background

'What kind of European am I? One needs to speak a language,' a young Polish respondent tells Meinhof and Galasinski in their 2002 study of intergenerational identity in German and Polish border communities. 'We are laughing that we are going to this Europe barefoot.' For him, to be European is to speak German, French, or English. But for the German brother and sister across the Neisse, the river border dividing the German city Guben from the Polish Gubin, Europeans dwell in pulsing, glittering cities, a world away from their humdrum provincial city in the former German Democratic Republic (GDR).

A European lives in Europe. This much we know. But what is Europe? Is it a continent or is it, as the nineteenth century Russian 'culturologist' Nikolai Danilevsky (1964) dismissively wrote, merely a peninsula of Asia? In a peninsular Europe, Turkey Spain, Italy, the Balkans, and Greece are tendrils, and so ends the squabble over Turkey's continental classification.

Europe's borders are tidal (WRR, 2001: 32) because they are social constructions. In the Middle Ages, Europe stopped at the River Don. By the eighteenth century, it had expanded to the Urals to accommodate Russia's turn to the West. Moscow's joining the ranks of European cities transforms Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi's proposal to invite a Russian application for membership in the EU (*European Voice*, 12–18 June 2003: 4) from the ridiculous to the conceivable.

Europe is also understood as a 'community of shared values in a given geographical area' (Schwimmer 2001). In this chapter we consider identity in the context of enlargement. We do so for three reasons. First, as the EU increasingly resembles a state, identity becomes less luxury, more necessity, becoming a stabilizing force in the state (Easton, 1965; Weiler, 1998: 8). Post-Maastricht Europeanization requires new member states to adopt a broad and deep *acquis*. The skeletal staffing of the EU's regulatory and judicial bodies virtually ensures that much of member state compliance depends upon civic virtue – the *sine qua non* of the well-functioning European state – and that identity becomes a powerful inner

dynamic of a European state. The standard alternative to territorial identity – religion (see de Tocqueville [1969: 44] on this point) – is not a practicable alternative in modern Europe. Second, the EU has actively sought to build an affective European identity. In this context, Jean Monnet once remarked, 'If we were beginning the European Community all over again, we should begin with culture' (quoted in Van Ham, 2000: 31). Third, a continuously expanding literature emphasizes the importance of identity to the integration project (see, for example, Cederman, 2000; Fossum, 2001; Howe, 1995; Malynov and Hendrick, 2003; Milward, 1992; Weiler, 1996).

We will pose a number of questions in this chapter in order to examine the implications of enlargement on the EU's future identity. Does a European identity exist? If so, can we discern characteristics distinguishing it from other territorially linked identities? Under what conditions will European identity form and/or intensify among citizens in the new member states? Will identity conflicts impede the pace of integration?

A European Identity . . . *Gemeinschaft* or *Gesellschaft*?

While there is substantial agreement amongst informed observers that there is a Europe and even Europeans (see, for example, see Ash, 1989; Van Ham 2000; Schwimmer, 2002; WRR, 2001), there is less agreement on who they are and in what they believe. What factors engender Europeaness – to the extent that such an identity exists – as opposed to being German, Maltese, or Czech? What is the causal variable? Does identity precede political legitimacy or does the modern state, through its control of instrumental benefits, produce over a certain period of time, as Easton (1965) argued, identification? EU policy makers need to understand the causal sequence if they are to nurture a European identity.

The German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies (1957) distinguishes between identity as *gemeinschaft* and as *gesellschaft*. The former may be thought of as identity in its original form – exemplified by family, neighbourhood and village; that is, as a deep sense of belonging, an affective identity. *Gesellschaft* is the modern manifestation of identity, involving the 'artificial construction of identity through state builders' production and distribution of benefits in exchange for citizen loyalty. *Gemeinschaft* produces the more stable, satisfying identification, but modern society, with its emphasis on utilitarianism and instrumentalism, roots out *gemeinschaft* whenever it impedes state-builders' goals. We will see how scholars draw on this tension between community and society in shaping their opinions about European identification.

There are, broadly speaking, four distinct explanatory theories on

identity formation: primordial/essentialist, postmodernist, postnationalist, and modernist. Each can be used to aid our understanding of European identity.

Primordialists and essentialists

Primordialists and essentialists view identity as natural and self-generating: its absence is indicative of political repression (Gellner, 1983: 129). *New* states need *old* nations, without the embedded pre-rational memory of nation (myths, legends, artifacts and heroes), the polity resists each incremental step in state-policy growth. If the primordialist interpretation correctly captures the inner dynamic of state stability, new member states' citizens would check EU policy deepening. Not surprisingly, the more integrationist EU-15 states expressed this very concern in relation to the 10 + 2 enlargement round.

Without this *affective* identification, primordialists – for example, Anthony Smith (1992) – believe it will take generations for a European identity to emerge. *Eurobarometer* results help us to evaluate the primordialist claim. In terms of how 'European' EU-15 citizens feel as compared to their respective nationalities, respondents in the spring of 2003 reported that they consider themselves either in terms of their own nationality or their own nationality *and* being European (see Table 6.1) Given the special circumstances in Luxembourg – where there are a large number of Eurocrats and Portuguese immigrants relative to the size of the country – it is perhaps not surprising that it stands out with the most citizens who consider themselves 'European Only', at 20 per cent. The next closest countries – Belgium, Germany and France – are at 6 per cent, with the lowest being Finland and Sweden at 1 per cent. The United Kingdom, with 64 per cent, has the highest percentage of respondents who claim only their own nationality.

The same overall tendency for people to have more affinity with their own nationality or their own nationality *and* Europe is evident among the new member and candidate EU states. Six per cent of the Latvian and Slovak *Eurobarometer* respondents consider themselves 'Only European', while none of the Hungarian respondents consider themselves 'Only European'. In the 'nationality only' category, the lowest countries are Cyprus and Slovakia, both of which have 25 per cent of their respondents claiming only Cypriot or Slovak as their nationality. Across the states surveyed the results are thus mixed; however, many citizens do clearly identify themselves, at least in part, as being European.

Whether the respondents see membership of the EU to be a 'good thing' or a 'bad thing', results for the EU-15 and the new member states are similar, though the latter have a more optimistic sense of what EU membership will do for their respective countries (see Table 6.2).

Table 6.1 *National and European identification in the EU-15, new member and candidate states**

Country	% Nationality only	% Nationality & European	% European & nationality	% European only
EU-15 states	40	44	8	4
Belgium	45	36	9	6
Denmark	37	52	7	3
Germany	34	45	12	6
Greece	53	41	3	3
Spain	34	52	8	3
France	34	49	9	6
Ireland	48	39	5	3
Italy	26	59	10	3
Luxembourg	21	45	10	20
Netherlands	21	43	7	3
Austria	46	43	8	3
Portugal	51	34	4	3
Finland	49	43	4	3
Sweden	56	38	4	1
United Kingdom	55	39	4	1
	64	24	4	3
New member states	33	54	6	2
Cyprus	25	63	8	2
Czech Republic	37	39	9	2
Estonia	39	36	10	5
Hungary	39	53	6	0
Latvia	31	41	7	6
Lithuania	35	39	9	3
Malta	30	59	6	1
Poland	32	60	5	1
Slovakia	25	49	13	6
Slovenia	32	57	5	2
Candidate States	42	45	4	3
Bulgaria	37	44	5	2
Romania	36	50	5	3
Turkey	52	41	3	3

Source: adapted from Table 5.1a, *Eurobarometer* 59.1 and Table 3.1 *Candidate Countries Eurobarometer* (Spring 2003).

* The question asked was: 'In the near future do you see yourself as . . . ?'

- '(Nationality) only'
- '(Nationality) and European'
- 'European and (Nationality)'
- 'Don't know'

Table 6.2 Attitudes toward EU membership in EU-15, new member and candidate states*

Country	% A 'good thing'	% A 'bad thing'	Neither 'good' nor 'bad'
EU-15 states	54	11	27
Belgium	67	7	20
Denmark	63	16	17
Germany	59	8	26
Greece	61	8	29
Spain	62	6	27
France	50	12	34
Ireland	67	5	16
Italy	64	6	22
Luxembourg	85	4	11
Netherlands	73	5	18
Austria	34	19	41
Portugal	61	9	24
Finland	42	17	37
Sweden	41	27	30
United Kingdom	30	25	31
New member states	58	8	26
Cyprus	72	4	21
Czech Republic	46	13	32
Estonia	31	16	42
Hungary	63	7	23
Latvia	37	15	40
Lithuania	65	9	23
Malta	51	19	24
Poland	61	7	23
Slovakia	59	5	30
Slovenia	57	7	33
Candidate states	70	5	46
Bulgaria	70	3	17
Romania	74	2	15
Turkey	67	11	14

Sources: adapted from Table 3.6.a. *Candidate Countries Eurobarometer* and Table 6.1a. *Eurobarometer* (Spring 2003)

*The question asked was: 'Generally speaking, do you think (our country's) membership of the European Union is/would be . . . ?'

- 'a good thing'
- 'a bad thing'
- 'neither good nor bad'
- 'don't know'

Overall, a majority of the respondents in EU-15 and new member states believe EU membership to be a 'good thing', at 54 per cent and 58 per cent respectively. Of the EU-15, Luxembourg, again, is the highest, with the UK and Austria the lowest. Among the new member states, Cyprus is the highest and Estonia the lowest. Across the new member states, an average of 70 per cent think EU membership is a 'good thing'.

Some caution should be exercised when interpreting Eurobarometer data as evidence for a widespread European identity. One reason for this is that some observers – for example, Meinhof and Galasinski (2002) – have found that European identity emerges only when survey respondents are prompted (as they are in *Eurobarometer* surveys), and even then identification varies, with some respondents thinking in terms of European culture, some in terms of a supranational (EU) state, and some in terms of a mix of the two. Another reason for caution centres on the longitudinal results of Eurobarometer identity questions; specifically the number of respondents identifying as 'European', alternately weakens and strengthens (Dalton and Eichenberg, 1993; Duchesne and Frogner, 1995; Gabel and Palmer, 1995; Gabel, 1998), prompting some scholars to conclude European identification is shallow rooted, affected by recent and personal events.

These findings seem to at least partly confirm the primordialist prediction of weak European identity. Nevertheless, we cannot discount the fact that some respondents *do* report a European identification, whether or not they are prompted to do so. The inconsistent percentage of identifiers across time is a different matter altogether as it concerns the *nature* of identification; if it is affective then stability would be expected, whereas if it is instrumental instability would be anticipated. We will return to this issue of the nature of identity later in this chapter.

Postmodernists

While the literature often treat 'postmodernism' and 'postnationalism' as synonyms, they represent opposite philosophical perspectives. For postmodernists, no identity trumps the other (Flynn, 1991). In a world devoid of universal realities, ethnic and national identity co-exists on a horizontal plane with lesbian, football enthusiasts, political party and environmental identities, even across borders. Yuppies, Goths, 30-somethings, holiday-loving pensioners, and vegans shape the EU in a 'free market of identities' (Bilting, 1995). Postmodernism thus asserts a perhaps unsettling notion of 'anything goes' – that being a member of a running club is equivalent to being Slovakian. The postmodernist would ask us to look forward to the many ways in which Western and Eastern Europe will forge cross-border identities.

Postmodernists, in focusing on identity, capture an important element of modern democratic society; namely, the proliferation of groups.

Democratic theorists, indeed, call these 'groups' rather than 'identities' and point to their proliferation as evidence of a trend toward democratization in advanced industrialized societies rather than an explicit challenge to national identity. The issue becomes confused because identity, as we have seen, exhibits both affective and instrumental dimensions; groups, too, offer their members both instrumental and affective benefits. Yet, most of us would not think to use the term 'identity' and 'group' interchangeably; for example, does anyone believe that German and British holiday pensioners have a shared identity when their motivation is finding the most affordable holiday in a half-day's journey?

While useful in recognizing the subnational interactions among East and West, postmodernism stumbles both descriptively and prescriptively. It does so partly because while there are EU state borders there cannot be a free market in identities (Faist, 2001: 46). It also elevates to the level of 'identity' what are more properly 'shared interests'. Finally, postmodernism, in denying extraneous, universally rational standards as myth, promotes 'virulent nationalism', a possibility Europeans clearly cannot afford to dismiss (Gellner, 1983: 120).

Postnationalists: globalization, cosmopolitanism, and social democracy

From a postnational perspective, globalization, cosmopolitan democracy, and social democracy predict that international or transnational identities will supplant national identity.

Globalization

Globalization emphasizes a Europe of multinational corporations and mobile professionals. Friedman (quoted in Van Ham, 2001: 34 as an example of an 'updated and vulgar version of Kant') suggests 'no two countries that both have a McDonald's have ever fought a war against each other'. Laffan (1996: 95) calls this EU a 'soulless market'. It is a Europe of elites: Edmund Burke thought that 'no European can be a complete exile in any part of Europe' (Hay, 1968: 117); Lenin (1915) argued that Europe's leisure and business class is and always will be 'European'; and Trevor Lloyd (1997: 548) has suggested that 'most people who think themselves as 'Europeans' [probably] have at least a Master of Arts degree'. On this basis, if the number of European identifiers is increasing it can be attributed to a shrinking working class and growing professional class.

This interpretation is clearly limited by the fact that globalization is seen as benefiting directly and significantly a relatively small number of citizenry. For, as Anderson (1983: 203) states, 'the problem has always been how to create nations out of the everyday man. There has always

been a connectedness among the elites'. Modern territorially-based identities must be felt equally by all citizens.

Cosmopolitanism

While cosmopolitans are sometimes labeled postmodern (see discussion above), their orientation is fundamentally different. Cosmopolitans, in predicting a diminishing role for states, point to the power international organizations wield in setting standards for respecting and protecting human rights, democracy, and the rule of law (Schwimmer 2001).

No one would describe the European Community's founding as European *gemeinschaft*. Why, then, would cosmopolitans describe the European Union as a community of Europeans? Many of them would start with 'Maastricht', where they would see the creation of a legally recognized European citizenship and the legal recognition accorded to the Social Charter as laying the basis of a new *gemeinschaft* based on a civic code of collective identity (Eisenstadt and Giesen, 1995: 81).

Western Europe has achieved a civil society where corruption, while not eliminated, attracts strict sanction and harsh punishment. Respect for human rights is enshrined in modern democracy. Yet corruption remains stubbornly common in the CEECs (European Commission: 2002c) and the EU, while achieving some success in promoting minority rights (such as for the Hungarians in Slovakia, the Roma in most of the CEECs, and Russians in Latvia), cannot monitor all political campaign rhetoric, each speech in parliament, every local law. Cosmopolitans, ironically criticized as idealists, point to the limited financial capacity of the CEECs to root out corruption, improve administrative capacities, and protect the rights of minorities and women.

Cosmopolitans, too, point to a tendency to blur democracy and capitalism in the minds of the citizenry in former communist countries. According to Habermas (1999: 118-19), constitutional patriotism 'can take the place originally occupied by nationalism if the people recognize that they are materially better off'. Democratic values emerge and harden into a civic culture as the people learn and grow in a market economy (Ash 1998: 53). CEECs, with their fledgling democracies and market economies, could import instability to the EU (Willis, 1996).

Cosmopolitans also suspect that the CEECs think of themselves as *natio* or *gens*, rather than civic nations (Fowler, 2002: 22; Habermas, 1999: 109). Without a democratic political culture, how will the new member states' politics react to economic downturns (Breton *et al.*, 1995: 25)? Will opportunistic politicians exploit CEEC insecurity?

Cosmopolitan democracy, as we have seen, is based on rational enlightenment. Herein perhaps lies its major flaw. Whether the majority of the polity can be reasoned with and will, in turn, reason with others,

is a philosophical conundrum generating as much debate today as it did in the eighteenth century.

Cosmopolitans suggest that Europeans are *weltbürger* [world citizens] (Gottdiener, 1995: 233) living under *weltbürgerrecht* [world/cosmopolitan law] (Habermas, 1999: xxvi). Yet identity is tied to 'otherness' (Anderson 1983: 73). A nation is 'a people with a common confusion as to their origins and a common antipathy to their neighbors' (Harnelink, 1972, quoted in Cohen, 1998: 33). People have a deeply-felt psychological need to distinguish themselves from those whom they are most alike: what Freud (1985) called the narcissism of small differences. Cosmopolitan democracy fails to explain the tendency of people to behave 'irrationally' and Kant's pacific union overlooks the plainly observable phenomenon that substantial numbers of people enjoy the solidarity of otherness that nationhood offers.

Does this mean that cosmopolitan democracy has nothing to teach us about identity formation in the EU-25? Not at all. We should be cautious about dismissing the influence of cosmopolitan democracy among the CEECs' elites who are in the driving seat of enlargement. For many of these elites have been strongly influenced, directly or indirectly, by Habermas' Frankfurt School, with its reincarnation of enlightenment philosophy and its perception of the possibility of the postnational state. We will return to this point later in the chapter.

Social Democracy

Despite the fact that Europeans created postmodernism – Foucault, Derrida, Levi-Strauss – it has colonized entire academic departments only in the US. Perhaps this is because the postmodern contention that identity politics has replaced class-based politics is less applicable to continental Europe. Plurality manifests itself in groups, a critical distinction in an American democracy lacking the class-based parties and proportional representation electoral systems of continental Europe. Lenin (1914) wrote: 'Our banner does not carry the slogan "national culture" but *international* culture, which unites all the nations in a higher, socialist unity.' Could the intellectual legacy of European Marxists/Leninists hold the key to a unique European identity?

If we can argue for the moment that states nurture identity, then European states have produced a common culture that supports social democracy; this, then could be a fundamental element of European identity. Certainly the European left sees matters this way. This point of view is exemplified by Žižek's (1998: 77) comment that 'from the sublime heights of Habermas' theory to vulgar market ideologists, we are bombarded by different versions of depoliticization'.

Is it realistic to suggest there could be a European cultural and political identity rooted in class solidarity? It has become a truism that national identity trumps class-based identity since the 1907 resolution of the Second International, pledging worker solidarity in the event of war, fell to pieces when the majority of the socialist parties of Europe ignored their own resolution in August 1914, voting to support their respective countries in World War 1.

Nevertheless, Faist (2001: 51) reminds us that welfare state institutions were developed first and collective identities resulted from them. Who then better to understand the benefits of social democracy than the citizens of the CEECs? Nor can we discount the opposition to EU membership in some of the new member states, where in Poland 22 per cent, in the Czech Republic 23 per cent, and in Hungary 16 per cent voted against joining the EU (see the Chronology for the results of all the accession referendums).

Perhaps the CEECs could be attracted to a European identity that distinguishes itself from all other advanced industrialized democracies: one based on homegrown European social democracy. Western Europe has consistently been more favourable to welfare spending than the United States, and European political parties of the centre-left describe their platforms as putting a human face on capitalism. Does this hold true for the CEECs as well, or has the reaction against the communist era moved citizen attitudes to the right, thus nearer to American-style capitalism? The empirical evidence suggests that the CEECs may, in fact, have *more* favourable attitudes toward social welfare spending than exists in Western Europe, with Lipsmeyer and Nordstrom (2003) finding a statistically significant difference between the two regions.

While this may take us closer to answering the question 'whither European identity?', we are no closer to understanding causality. While European social democracy may form the basis of 'otherness', we have not addressed the process by which this identity forms. We know intuitively what the research has long shown: individual characteristics – skill levels, family status, age, education, income – shape support for welfare spending. How might self-interest shape and reinforce European identity? To answer these questions, we must turn to the explanations offered by 'Modernists'.

Modernists

Transnationalists place national identity in a transitory phase between ethnic and civil culture; modernists, on the other hand, are more sceptical of an evolving dynamic. Both traditions recognize capitalism as a precondition for nations because labour mobility is a precursor to industrialization and national identity encourages this mobility (Gellner 1983: 105). Postnationalists and modernists part company in postnationalist

predictions of a progressive irrelevance of state and nation, although modernists will concede that nationalism in advanced industrialized societies is in 'a muted, less virulent form' (Gellner, 1983: 122). Unlike the primordialists who believe most existing nations preceded their respective states, the modernists counters 'the mere fact of existing for a few decades, less than the length of a single lifetime, may be enough to establish at least a *passive* (emphasis added) identification with a new nation-state' (Hobsbawm, 1990: 86). The modifier 'passive' is key to this perspective, a point to which we will return below.

What type of identification does the state foster? David Easton believed that specific support (utilitarian or instrumental) precedes and shapes affective identification, but that inevitably state builders strive to build affective identification because of its 'reservoir of favorable attitudes or goodwill that helps members to accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed' (1965: 273). The danger, scholars suggest, is that short-term identification based on self-interest runs only as deep as immediate benefits (Almond and Verba, 1963; Dahl, 1989; Putnam, 1993). Has the EU fostered affective or instrumental identity, and should it have?

Laffan (1996: 100) recommends 'the affective dimension of the European project is critical to the Union', asserting that 'the Monnet method has reached its limits'. The EU has certainly attempted to promote the affective dimension. It did, for example, implement many of the recommendations of the 1985 Adonino Report on 'A People's Europe' (European Commission 1985), which had been requested by the 1984 Fontainebleau summit, including those on a European passport, student and teacher exchanges, European sporting events, and the twinning of towns and cities. Moreira (2000) documents the European Commission's preference for funding projects that celebrate a concept of Europe – unitary, republican citizenship – rather than a multicultural Europe, whilst Thelmer (1999) reviews EU attempts to promote a European identity through cultural, audiovisual policy, and education. Even the euro could have an affective component: Helleiner (1998:1419) believes that the euro bolsters identity because it enables its users to communicate in the same economic language when discussing pensions, wages, and retail prices.

But notwithstanding this involvement in promoting affective identity, the EU has been and continues to be most actively engaged in policies and activities that build instrumental identity. The citizens actively support the state in exchange for security and prosperity – a Hobbesian rather than a postnational Rousseauian view of citizen–state relations (Van Kersbergen, 2000: 8). Instrumental or utilitarian identification relies on motives. For instance, the opportunity for a Czech national to identify as a European rather than lose her Czech identity and family roots by emigrating to the USA could hardly be thought of as an affective choice:

the Czech emigrates to Western Europe because its proximity enables her to achieve personal and professional goals with fewer trade offs. The effects of new member states' compliance with the Schengen *acquis* support the instrumentality of citizenship (Fowler, 2002: 35): surveys have found that Croatian-Romanians began applying for Croatian citizenship when Croatia was removed from the EU's visa blacklist and Romanian-Moldovans increased their demands for Romanian citizenship after the 1999 Helsinki Summit where the European Council decided to open accession negotiations with Romania. Furthermore, individuals expected to benefit from integration report higher support for the EU: people living closer to the borders (Anderson, 1996a, 1996b); citizens in states receiving substantial EU financial support (Carrubba, 1997); the more educated; and the young seeking study opportunities (European Commission, 2002e, 2003c). Gabel (1998) and Gabel and Palmer (1995) find that the combined effect of socio-demographic differences (divided according to expected benefits) has as strong an effect on integration support as nationality.

Given that Europeans are more likely to form instrumental, rather than affective identities, how will this tendency shape relations between the citizens and governments in the enlarged EU? And how might this affect the integration efforts of EU policy-makers?

Attitudes in the New Member States:

Costs and Benefits

We have argued that the extent to which citizens identify as Europeans can be attributed (primarily) to instrumental benefits. This is so for two main reasons. First, support for integration tends to be strongest among those individuals most likely to benefit from EU membership. Second, the fluctuations in identity support probably reflect changing individual assessments of the immediate benefits offered at the European level of government. This conclusion corroborates Easton's prediction that instrumental identity precedes affective attachments, precisely what we would expect in an organization existing less than five decades.

As regards the expected benefits of accession, we have two pieces of evidence from the new member states of the importance of instrumental needs: Eurobarometer data and attitudes during the accession negotiations.

Taking 2003 *Eurobarometer* data, when asked, 'taking everything into consideration, what will the EU have brought in 10 years' time for the European citizens?', 48 per cent of positive responses were for economic reasons, whilst only 3 per cent mentioned identity (European Commission 2003c: 49). When respondents were asked to rank-order answers to 'what

the EU means to you personally', 70 per cent listed 'better future for youth', 61 per cent 'freedom of movement', 58 per cent 'a way to create jobs', 52 per cent 'lasting peace', 49 per cent 'protection of citizens' rights', and 45 per cent 'improving the (national) economy'. 'Being a citizen of the EU' meant 'right to work in any country in the EU' for 72 per cent of the respondents, 'being able to study in any EU country' for 69 per cent, 'the right to move permanently to any country in the EU' for 68 per cent, and 'the right to vote in EP elections in the member state in which one resides or lives, regardless of nationality' for 32 per cent (European Commission, 2003c). 'Political rights' simply did not appear as one of the top three rights in any of the then candidate states.

On the other hand, only 34 per cent showed concern 'for the loss of national identity', 39 per cent concern for 'one's language used less and less', while 50 per cent showed more concern about increased drug trafficking and international organized crime (European Commission, 2003c: 121).

Following Easton's theory, it follows that the EU can forge a European identity, or at least a loyalty, among new member states by ensuring the benefits of joining outweigh the costs. As illustrated in other chapters in this book, benefits are expected in some policy areas, but disappointments are equally likely in others.

Among the most controversial chapters of the accession negotiations in the CEECs – as measured by protracted talks and public grumblings – were those concerning labour mobility and Justice and Home Affairs (especially Schengen). How are these two policies affecting the CEECs and what is the likely impact on the forging of a European identity among the citizenry?

Free movement of labour

In the modernist explanation of identity, particularly Gellner (1983) and Deutsch *et al.* (1957), labour mobility is the determining factor in both geographical identity formation and successful political integration. In fact, Deutsch *et al.* (53–54) speculated that mobility of persons might be *more* important than either goods or money. This issue continues to concern governments in the new member states. Viktor Orban, Hungary's former centre-right Prime Minister, for instance, has argued that without free labour mobility an enlarged EU would resemble a class-system (Jileva, 2002). In preparing the EU's common position for the accession negotiations, however, most of the EU-15 were unwilling to concede immediate free movement of labour to CEECs and insisted that they be subject to a transition period of up to seven years. This was duly incorporated into the accession agreements, with each EU-15 state left to choose whether to take advantage of it. In the event, all of the EU-15 did announce restrictions of some kind on CEEC workers. This derogation

on labour mobility would probably be a less bitter pill for the new member states if the EU did not encourage labour mobility amongst themselves. It certainly seems that Germany and Austria are gaining the most advantages of the CEECs' enlargement with regard to trade and investment, but are unwilling to accept potential costs to disrupted labour markets in border towns and cities. The perception of unfairness is palpable. Meinhof and Galasinski (2002, 81) cite the following informant's response as typical of the Polish attitude toward accession: 'It is now known that a German in Poland when we join the Union will be able to do everything, including work and we (not until) 10 years' time'.

What is the likely effect of derogations on European identity in a Europe of 'metrics' – long-term residents excluded from the polls (Walzer, 1983)? Clearly there is a sense of unfairness, reinforcing the notion of 'otherness'. We alluded earlier to Anderson's (1983) historical research in which he discovered a causal link between lack of opportunities for the more ambitious inhabitants of a region and nationalism. How can the EU forge a European identity among the new member states if their otherness is reinforced in an area of such paramount concern to their citizenry?

While it is often thought that limiting emigration from third countries is necessary to protect the jobs of citizens in the EU-15, this does not in fact appear to be the case. There are several reasons for this.

First, survey data indicate that CEEC citizens desire to work, but to a lesser extent settle, in Western Europe. Claire Wallace's (2002: 605) analysis of the International Organization for Migration's 1998 survey data concludes that Poles, Czechs, Hungarians, and Slovaks prefer Germany to other EU member states for work, but a smaller number actually wish to *settle* in Germany compared to the US (see Table 6.3). And while substantial numbers of the CEECs' citizens would like the experience of working abroad, only a small number would choose to

Table 6.3 *Attitudes in selected CEECs to working and settling abroad*

	Working abroad, Germany (%)	Settling abroad, Germany (%)	Settling abroad, US (%)
Poles	36	5	20
Czechs	38	6	14
Hungarians	25	2	7
Slovaks	17	<1	7

Source: adapted from the 1998 survey data of the International Organization for Migration, as analysed by Wallace (2002).

dwell permanently outside of their countries. Wallace (2002: 621) concludes that migration is 'short-term, circulatory, commuting' (sometimes characterized as *pendeln*) (Favell and Hansen, 2002) – involving back and forth movement. She speculates that EU-15 states closing their labour markets to the CEECs' citizens will actually *increase* long-term resettlement by hindering frequent migration. This situation may be exacerbated when low value-added industry originating from the EU-15 abandons the EU 10 + 2 for lower wage countries in Asia, for this could lead to short-term demand to emigrate to the EU-15, thus further fueling resentment over the labour mobility derogation (see, for example, Dyker, 2000: 16; Hudson, 2002: 11; Willis 1996: 156.)

Second, there is the commonly known psychology of emigration: push is a stronger force than pull. With average growth rates in recent years of around 5 per cent in the CEECs (compared to 1 per cent in the EU-15), the continent may experience reverse migration as more Western Europeans are attracted to increased opportunities available to them in the East in an integrated Union. This conjures an image of Westerners being able to cross the EU's borders freely, whilst Easterners cannot.

Third, the very individuals whom the EU should be trying to reach – young people – are most negatively affected by derogations. Their situation is captured by Slovakian student Ivana Holeciova's comment to a *BBC News* reporter (2002):

All young people support the EU. It will make it easier for us to study and work wherever we want in Europe. It's not that we all want to move away from Slovakia and get rich in the west, it's just that being able to travel is part of our freedom, something that our parents and grandparents have not always had.

Fourth, the EU-15's low population growth rate (3.7 per cent until at least 2025) ensures that the EU-15 will increasingly experience labour shortages. By 2025, 22.4 per cent of the EU-15 population will be over 65 (Geddes, 2002). But, in fact, the CEECs' population rates are mimicking those of the EU-15, so they may well not be able to provide the working age people needed to compensate for Europe's aging workforce! The EU will need to *stimulate* labour mobility to at least the levels of fluidity of the United States. While identity is certainly not the only factor promoting mobility – the EU has much work ahead of it in creating, for example, portable pensions and health benefits and in harmonizing tax policies – creating a sense of *continental* identity to encourage all Europeans to move about in search of better, more satisfying employment should have a non-trivial effect on EU growth rates.

Finally, Europe still lacks in diversity compared to the traditional recipients of immigrants. Only 5.3 per cent of Europeans are foreign-born, compared to 10.3 and 25 per cent in the US and Australia, respectively

(Schiffers, 2002). Diversity is considered by many experts to be an important contributory factor in the energetic economies of Australia, Canada and the United States.

So, although labour mobility may be seen as being essential for creating a sense of Europeaness, this historic (and seemingly costless) opportunity to create good will and to afford restless and curious citizens of the CEECs the opportunity to move about the West for school and work, may be lost. Or at least it could be so if the EU-15 fail to recognize that the benefits to the EU-25 of free labour mobility far exceed the costs and that one of these benefits – strengthened identity – will produce synergistic effects throughout the Union.

Schengen

Another area of concern for new member states is the way the Schengen *acquis* – which involves the gradual abolition of checks at participating states' common borders – interrupts historical ties of countries in the region. Jileva (2002) reminds us that despite proscribed travel to the West, visiting Socialist countries was routine for the citizens of CEECs in the late communist period. But Schengen creates new barriers at traditional border crossings between the CEECs and neighbouring countries. Schengen, thus, disrupts movements of goods and people among Slavic countries and requires CEECs to distance themselves from peoples with whom they share historical and linguistic ties, thus undermining both affective and instrumental identification with peoples to their east. This reinforcement of 'otherness' also risks engendering a mixed sense of guilt and insecurity – with the latter being exemplified by CEECs' citizens' fears about cross-border crime.

Poland's 1998 Act on Foreigners, Migrants and Border Traffic, designed to bring it into line with Schengen, introduced visas and vouchers for Belarussians and Russians at \$60 a visa – at a time when a Belarussian earns, on average, \$30 per month. After implementation of the 1998 Act, the number of Russians crossing the border decreased by 48.5 per cent and of Belarussians by 35.8 per cent (Kisielowska-Lipman, 2002: 147). Schengen also disrupts border trade between Poland and the Ukraine, despite Korczow/Krakowice being one of the busiest border crossings in Europe (Kisielowska-Lipman, 2002: 148), and despite too the importance of the economic relationship between Poland and the Ukraine – the Ukraine is Poland's third largest trading partner.

These type of situations are being mirrored throughout the CEECs, with disruption to trade and employment, particularly among small- and medium-scale traders and businesses. The EU has virtually made the CEECs 'migration buffers', resulting, in the words of Poland's Foreign Minister, Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, in the imposition of a 'glass curtain'

between CEECs and their eastern neighbours. Most of the CEECs have attempted to implement policies to skirt Schengen, especially so as to maintain links with their ethnic minorities in non-EU states (Fowler, 2002: 7), but this has then naturally created problems with the EU

Zielonka (2001: 525) calls the Schengen *acquis* a symbol of 'inequality, division, and exclusion'. Indeed, while the EU offers permanent Schengen derogations to the UK and Ireland, and two non-EU countries – Iceland and Norway – have been admitted to the Schengen system, the EU required the new member states to adopt the whole Schengen *acquis* as an accession condition (Jileva, 2002). Furthermore, EU negotiators left the new member states little room for discretion in implementing Schengen (Mitsilegas, 2002).

Schengen brings us back to the beginning of our discussion: what is Europe? If the heart of Europe is in Prague, then the EU-25 will need to find the means to include the Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus in Schengen. Otherwise the EU-15 demands too much of its eastern frontier members: to turn their backs on their neighbours to the East and watch helplessly as their eastern border towns languish due to tightly restricted crossings. The EU risks creating a situation in which at least some CEECs may have to choose between a European and a pan-Slavic identity, when no such choice is necessary.

Schengen also places the new member states in the costly and politically sensitive position of policing borders with their less prosperous neighbours to the south and east. Looking in from the outside, the peoples of Turkey, the Balkan states, Ukraine, Belarus and Russia may thus become more estranged from the European cosmopolitan project, further exacerbating security concerns for those states on their borders.

Conclusions

What are the expectations of the new member states? Deutsch *et al.* (1957: 202) found that earlier successful integration experiences were shaped by 'the expectation of economic gains'. They stated that 'it was sufficient (even for amalgamation) if such expectations were fulfilled in part rather than completely, provided that a substantial portion of this fulfillment came at an early stage' (emphasis added).

Constructing a nation of Europeans loyal to a state-like EU will require a careful balance between rights and obligations. If new member states' citizens experience difficulty in arranging to work and study in the enlarged EU, and if the EU continues to ask the CEECs to abandon the peoples on their eastern borders, these concerns could, among others, unnecessarily delay the formation of a sense of Europeaness.

Whither identity? In this chapter we have reviewed the four principal interpretations of identity formation: primordialist, postmodern,

post-national and modern. How have they contributed to our understanding of identity formation in an enlarged EU?

Primordialists reject the modernist assertion that states foster nations to assist industrialization. Some nations existed prior to industrialization, even if imagined. To deny a sense of shared history – even if not all moments were experienced equally in all quarters of Europe – is to ignore the diffusion of ideas and goods simply due to propinquity. Although only a small percentage of the polity feels 'European', those individuals tend to be the decision-makers in European states. This is clearly a problem, but we believe the evidence supports the primordialist contention that a widespread affective attachment has yet to be formed.

Postmodernist scholarship also contributes to our understanding of European identity, although perhaps less directly than primordialist thought. Particularly interesting is the possible linkage between 'identity' and 'interests'. What in other federalist systems passes for 'identity politics' in Europe may be simply classic interest group behaviour. Interest groups, indeed, could play an increasingly important role in building cross-national linkages among the citizenry of the enlarged EU. This, in turn, would reinforce Europeaness.

Within postnational perspectives, cosmopolitan enlightenment has gained currency as an explanation for the way in which European identity might be forming. A major weakness in this neo-Kantian interpretation of European identity, however, is that apart from a few disagreements at the margins – for example, with the US maintaining the use of capital punishment and questioning aspects of the jurisdiction of international courts – Europe looks very much like its allies in the other advanced industrialized countries. Cosmopolitanism reinforces Europe's image as a 'higher civilization', but provides little in the way of 'otherness'.

As for the modernist emphasis on the *raison d'être* of identity, we conclude that a sense of identity will be integral to the ability of Europeanist states. A sense of belonging, which a common identity provides, is, for example, the *sine qua non* of labour mobility.

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Where Europe differs markedly from other advanced industrialized democracies is in the way its individual states have struggled and resolved the classic balance between efficiency and equality. This debate was to split Europe – the West choosing efficiency, the East, equality (even if it was imposed largely from outside) – but even the West produced working-class political parties and adopted socialist policies far beyond that of any other modern capitalist state. It is not an exaggeration to say that Western Europe invented social democracy. During the

Cold War many Western European socialist and communist parties (particularly in Italy and France), assiduously and indefatigably worked to keep open the links between West and East. Despite the metaphor of the iron curtain, the East was never completely isolated from the West – largely because of this sense that Western Europe had found a middle way between America and the Soviet Union. In this context, the centrality of social democracy clearly delineates the European from the American approach to economic competitiveness.

This identity – whether it is called social democracy, the human face of capitalism, the Third Way, or the sensible middle – is instrumental. It precedes the affective identification that might begin to form in the years to come.

It has been said that Europeans are Americans who are afraid to get on boats. A less politically conservative interpretation of migratory patterns seems equally valid: Europeans are people who remained behind to do the hard work of turning something old to something new, refurbishing an old and stately house one copper pipe at a time. This reluctance to leave, or rather determination to stay, is an identity in and of itself that has manifested itself in Europe's social democracy. Thus, in the end it may be this European social democracy that sets Europe apart from the other advanced industrialized countries of the West, particularly the United States, but also Canada and Australia. That could well be the internal dynamic that links Western, Central, and Eastern Europe into a transnational state and produces a European identity.

Chapter 7 The Dem

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This chapter looks at the impact of enlargement on the EU's legitimacy and democracy. First, it considers the derivation of legitimacy, focusing upon empirical as well as normative means, particularly those derived from democratic practices. Second, it looks at the relevance of legitimacy to the EU, asking why the EU, which is not a state, requires legitimacy. Third, it examines the correlation between enlargement and legitimacy and its relevance to the EU's form of liberal democracy. Fourth, it looks at the potential effects of enlargement upon normative and empirical legitimacy, arguing that legitimacy may be derived from the EU's performance as well as from its political and constitutional construction. Hence, the chapter considers both the internal impact of enlargement on longer-standing and new citizens, and the external impact of an enlarged EU on the international community.

What is Legitimacy?

Analyzing legitimacy has always been something of a problem. As Schmitter (2001) remarks: 'It ranks up there with "power" in terms of how much it is needed, how difficult it is to define and how impossible it is to measure.' The literature on the subject tends to place its acquisition into two categories: the normative and the empirical. Normative theorists argue that forms of legitimization depend upon established ethics and principles – particularly those derived from democratic norms and values. A popular mandate for governmental activity and the need for a government to be chosen under and subject to a system that has acquired popular sanction (Beetham, 1992) are both ingredients of the *normative* legitimate polity. In relation to the EU, some theorists, for example Moravcsik (2002) and Zweifel (2002), argue that since the EU fulfils these criteria (and, Moravcsik adds, rather better than some existing western democracies) concerns about its 'democratic deficit', and hence its 'legitimacy deficit', are misplaced.